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Abstract
We propose a theory in which geographic attributes explain cross-regional institutional
diﬀerences in: (1) the scale of the state, (2) the distribution of power within state
hierarchy, and (3) property rights to land. In this theory, geography and technology
aﬀect the transparency of farming; and transparency, in turn, aﬀects the elite’s ability
to appropriate revenue from the farming sector, thus aﬀecting institutions. We apply
the theory to explain diﬀerences between the institutions of Ancient Egypt, Southern
Mesopotamia and Northern Mesopotamia, and also discuss its relevance to modern
phenomena.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Following North (1981), recent theories about the success of nations ascribe a paramount
role to the protection of property rights. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that the
greatest detriment to economic prosperity is the presence of extractive institutions that
compromise property rights. Ancient Egypt, however, had a prosperous civilization, built
the great pyramids, and was stable over several millennia, in spite of having an extractive
government and no land property rights for its peasant farmers.
We thus propose that North’s thesis about the importance of property rights pertains
to post-agricultural societies, where private capital accumulation assumes a dominant role,
but is less relevant for understanding agricultural societies where land is the main capital
asset. This calls for an alternative theory to explain the success of some nations in the
preindustrial world and the failure of others. In this paper, we seek to explain variations
among pre-modern farming societies in: the scale of the state; the relative power of the
center versus the periphery; and the land tenure regime. Unlike Acemoglu and Robinson
(2012), who argue that institutions are by and large determined by the vagaries of human
history, we propose a mechanism that explains how diﬀerences in institutions are the result
of diﬀerences in geography and technology.
Our basic argument is that the government’s ability to appropriate revenue from the
farming sector was a key factor that accounts for diﬀerences between the institutions of earlier
states; and that this ability to appropriate was significantly aﬀected by the transparency
of production, and, in turn, by geographical and technological conditions. In a nutshell,
we attribute the resilience and control of Ancient Egypt’s central government, the relative
weakness of its regional cities, and the peasantry’s non-ownership of land, to the fact that
its farming was highly transparent, and thus readily appropriable. From this perspective,
Egypt is a polar case. Low transparency, on the other hand, explains the existence of owner-
occupied farming and the relative weakness of the states in other regions, such as ancient
Northern Mesopotamia.
We choose to illustrate the applicability of our model by focusing on the ancient civiliza-
tions of the Near East during the late fourth to the second millennia BCE, since these were
pristine cases of societies under relatively stable economic and military conditions, prior to
the emergence of monetized taxation and the military and administrative innovations that
facilitated the creation of empires. Although we focus on the role played by tax technology
in ancient states, we believe that our theory is pertinent to other established states as well,
providing an important insight in understanding pre-modern, agriculture-based states in gen-
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eral.1 Moreover, our appropriability theory can also help explain some modern phenomena.
First, since social institutions exhibit substantial inertia, our explanation of the institutions
in farming-based societies can improve our understanding of current ones. And, to the extent
that institutions impact the prosperity of nations, our model can expose deep-rooted factors
that account for the current variation in the wealth of nations.2 Secondly, several scholars
attribute the unprecedented increase in the relative scale of government in the past century
to a decline in the cost of collecting taxes.3 Our transparency theory provides a formal
structure and a broader perspective to this argument. Thus, according to our theory, there
is an analogy between the long-term eﬀects of the Agricultural Revolution in antiquity and
the modern Industrial Revolution: in both cases the increased transparency of production
transformed the state’s tax capacity.4
To better understand how our approach relates to the extensive literature on state intu-
itions, we present the literature survey after presenting the model (in the next section) and
its application to the civilizations of antiquity (in the section following the model). However,
we want to clarify at the outset that there are two key issues that we do not deal with in
this paper. First, we assume that the state is already established and that its government
has a monopoly on the power to coerce. Thus, we do not discuss the emergence of the state,
nor do we address the possible existence of external rivals and of warfare. Implicitly, in the
spirit of Olson (1993), we posit that a governing hierarchy is an outcome of the advantage
possessed by a dictator who monopolizes theft in the form of taxation, over uncoordinated
theft that destroys incentives. Our focus is on how the sovereign’s access to information
impacts its ability to appropriate. Second, we abstract from diﬀerences in land productivity,
which is the focus of a large body of literature that seeks to explain diﬀerences in early state
development. In this tradition, Diamond (1997), for example, attributes the relative back-
wardness of New Guinea to its low land productivity relative to that in Eurasia. And Dal
Bó et al. (2015) contend that states developed to provide defense in order to resolve what
they identify as “the paradox of civilization,” namely the vicious circle by which increased
1The notion of a ‘tax technology’ was proposed by Mayshar (1991).
2See Bockstette et al. (2002) and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013).
3Kau and Rubin (1981) and Kleven et al. (2016) contend that the shift away from self-employment in
agriculture into production by hired labor transformed the capacity to tax, since it was accompanied by a
paper trail that rendered private production much more transparent to the modern state and thus facilitated
income taxation.
4Consistently with our claim, de la Sierra (2016) employs evidence from the mining regions of the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo to show that a rise in the price of the metallic substance coltan – produced from
relatively bulky and hence transparent ores – led to the cessation of conflict between rival armed groups
and to the monopolization of violence in the coltan rich regions; whereas an increase in the price of gold,
which is easier to conceal and is hence less transparent, did not.
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land productivity encourages predation, but farmers’ enhanced insecurity discourages the
investment that generates that increase in productivity.
The theory that we propose is based on a variant of the conventional principal-agent
paradigm.5 We address here three features that we incorporate in this framework. First,
we focus on variation in the extent of information asymmetry between agents, representing
tenant farmers/tax payers, and the principal, representing an absentee land-owner or the
government. In particular, the principal observes a signal about the state of nature that
determines the productivity of farmers’ eﬀort. On the basis of this signal, the principal
infers with some error whether the agent worked diligently or not. The accuracy of this
signal is our main exogenous variable, representing the degree of transparency of farming.
The level of inundation of the Nile in Egypt is an example of such a signal. Second, we
limit the incentive scheme that is available to the principal by assuming that in addition
to remuneration (carrot), the only feasible sanction (stick) is the threat of dismissal upon
suspected shirking. We assume that such dismissal is costly also for the principal.6 In the
spirit of Shapiro and Stiglitz’s (1984) “eﬃciency wages” theory of employment contracts, this
implies that unlike the standard applications of the principal-agent framework, the agent’s
outcome is not pinned down to his outside option. Third, to make the threat of dismissal
meaningful, we embed the model in a multi-period setting.
The model’s results are fairly intuitive: when the signal is more accurate, the role of
the carrot is smaller, the role of the stick is larger, and the principal collects more revenue.
Our interpretation of these results is that greater transparency induces a form of servitude,
since the tenant is denied tenure and may be evicted upon suspected shirking. On the other
hand, when there is low transparency, the agent retains more of the output without facing
the threat of dismissal.7
5In employing a formal game theoretic model for explaining historical institutions, we follow the lead of
Greif (2006).
6Our assumption that the sanction is in the form of a threat of eviction is consistent with the literature
on tenancy contracts (e.g. Banerjee and Ghatak 2004). One might question why we do not allow for corporal
punishment as an incentive device, as was common with slaves; since this is painful for the agent but plausibly
imposes only minor costs on the principal. We do not attempt to resolve this puzzle here, but note that
Chwe (1990) points out that corporal punishment is rare in labor relations, even though it is common for
criminal oﬀences. Moreover, we also note that the peasants in ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia were almost
invariably free tenants, rather than slaves, while slaves were not usually employed in agriculture (Dandamaev
1984, 277). We surmise that this may be due to the fact that in the absence of the threat of dismissal, slaves
(unlike tenants) require close ongoing supervision.
7In our model, the principal is assumed to observe output but not the state of nature or the agent’s eﬀort.
In online Appendix A we present an alternative framework that delivers similar qualitative results, in which
the principal does not observe output and the moral hazard problem pertains to hiding (or misreporting)
output by the agent. In online Appendix B we examine an alternative modeling strategy to demonstrate
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In North’s (1981) depiction of the evolution of property rights in western societies since
the Middle Ages, property rights are granted by an authoritarian government that seeks
to maximize its revenue. This is the case also in our framework. However, in North’s
formulation the elite grant property rights to encourage private investment by the non-elite;
that is, property rights serve as a commitment device to overcome the hold-up problem of
ex-post expropriation. In contrast, in our framework, private investment does not have a
role. By focusing on the information constraints that hinder the appropriation of output, our
theory oﬀers an alternative explanation for the emergence of property rights to land. When
transparency is high enough, the threat of dismissal – an indicator for the lack of property
rights – is the prime motive for the agent to exert eﬀort. But with suﬃcient opacity –
when the cost of erroneous dismissal outweighs the benefits – the absolute, non-benevolent
state, willingly gives up the option to dismiss, thus granting farmers de facto title to the
land they cultivate. That is, according to our theory, property rights to land are explained
by the extent of information asymmetry.
In a two-layered extension of the model, designed to explain variations in the extent of
state centralization, we examine the role of diﬀerent degrees of transparency at diﬀerent
tiers of the governmental hierarchy. We show that when local farming activity is suﬃciently
transparent, not only to the intermediary (governor), but also to the upper level of the
hierarchy (king), the intermediary retains a smaller share of the revenue and is subject to
dismissal. On the other hand, if farming activity is suﬃciently opaque to the king, the
governor retains autonomy and a larger share of revenue.
We contend that the success of early central states, such as ancient Egypt, was due
to high global transparency that enabled the central authority to keep the subordinated
intermediary lords at bay, and to extract a larger share of revenue from the periphery to
the center. In contrast, the fragile and fragmented structure of the early states in Northern
Mesopotamia reflects the region’s low local and global transparency. In an intermediate
case, high local but low global transparency of farming in Southern Mesopotamia resulted
in strong local urban elites that managed to retain power in the face of repeated attempts
to subjugate them to a unified central state.
We note that our theory complements recent attempts to attribute key features of Imper-
ial China to its fiscal capacity. According to Ma (2011), Imperial China achieved long-term
success by replacing a hereditary feudal system with a rotating meritocratic bureaucracy.
that when the principal can choose costly monitoring to obtain a signal about the agent’s eﬀort, the principal
will choose to monitor and to punish the agent upon suspected shirking only if the accuracy of the signal
is suﬃciently high and the cost of monitoring suﬃciently low. Thus, as in the main model, opacity leads
to property rights, whereas transparency of eﬀort at a low cost leads to a form of servitude. Dari-Mattiacci
(2013) provides a similar theory, based on information asymmetry, to explain slavery.
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Denying tenure to local provincial oﬃcials prevented their ability to acquire the local inform-
ational advantage that would otherwise have given them independent power. We find this
administrative innovation to be analogous to the (natural) lack of informational advantage
by provincial oﬃcials in Ancient Egypt, which gave greater power to the Pharaohs.8
2 THEORY
We develop a version of the conventional principal-agent model to facilitate analysis of the
eﬀect of the extent of informational asymmetry. We consider a state with a given area of
arable land, which is divided into plots. Each plot is allocated to one risk neutral agent-
tenant, and produces either high or low output. High output is obtained if and only if the
agent exerts high eﬀort and the state of nature is “good.” Each agent decides whether to
exert high or low eﬀort. His payoﬀ is the payment received from the principal, less his cost
of exerting eﬀort. The principal incentivizes agents using a ‘carrot’ in the form of a bonus
payment upon delivering high output, and a ‘stick’ in the form of dismissal as punishment for
suspected shirking. We assume that dismissal is painful for the agent, who is forced out of
farming and into the urban sector, where he becomes a servant and enjoys no rents. Dismissal
is also costly for the principal (the state). The principal designs a contract that maximizes
her expected periodic income. This income equals the total output produced by all agents,
net of the payments to the agents, and net of the cost incurred by dismissing agents suspected
of shirking. The principal does not observe the state of nature, but observes a signal on this
state. The accuracy of this signal is our main exogenous variable, representing the degree of
transparency of farming. The model’s main result is that dismissal is conditioned on failure
to deliver high output, coupled with a signal that is suﬃciently accurate and that indicates
that the state of nature was likely to have been “good.”
2.1 The Basic Model
The annual output ( ) produced by the agent and the agent’s choice of eﬀort () can be
either low or high:  ∈ {}, and  ∈ { }, respectively. The state of nature is also
binary: either good or bad:  ∈ {}. Output is a function of the eﬀort exerted by the
agent and the state of nature, whereby output is high if and only if the state of nature is
8On the other hand, Sng (2014) and Sng and Moriguchi (2014) seek to explain the weakness of early
modern Imperial China by focusing on the agency problems that resulted from the size of the Empire. They
posit that the vast size of the Empire created inherent diﬃculties in supervising local intermediaries, who
used their power to extort taxes, whereas the central state sought to keep tax rates low to prevent revolts.
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good and the agent exerts high eﬀort:
 =
(
 if  =  and  = ;
 otherwise.
The ex ante probability that the state of nature is good is denoted by:  ∈ (0 1). The
agent chooses the level of eﬀort before he learns the state of nature. After choosing the level
of eﬀort, both the agent and the principal observe a public signal about the state of nature:
 ∈ { } The accuracy of this signal,  ∈ [05 1] is such that:
(|) = (|) = ; (|) = (|) = 1− 
The accuracy level  represents the degree of transparency of production. If  = 1 then
the signal perfectly reveals the state of the world (in this case, if  =  and  = , the
principal can be certain that the agent shirked); if  = 05 then the signal is uninformative.
Thus, we model transparency and land productivity as exogenous, and abstract from the
fact that both could be aﬀected by the principal and the agent. The principal might invest,
for example, in monitoring, or in increasing productivity through irrigation systems. Farmers
could impact transparency and productivity by the choice of crop type, or by investing in
land improvements. We contend, however, that our abstraction should not have a qualitative
eﬀect on the theory’s prediction as long as exogenous geographical factors have a major
impact on transparency and productivity.
We denote the annual cost (in units of output) of providing for the agent (and his family)
until the next harvest period by  + , where  ≥ 0 is the cost of subsistence in case the
agent exerts low eﬀort, and   0 is the annual cost of exerting high eﬀort. We assume that
even low output is suﬃcient to cover the cost of upkeep of an agent who exerts high eﬀort:
 ≥  + . We assume also that    + . This implies that it is desirable for the
principal to incentivize the agent to exert eﬀort.
Both the agent and the principal are assumed to be risk neutral. The agent’s annual
utility as a tenant farmer equals his expected income, denoted by , less the cost of subsist-
ence and eﬀort. Thus, the agent’s annual utility if he exerts high and low eﬀort is given by
 − (+ ) and  −, respectively. The utility of a dismissed agent is normalized to zero.
We assume that the agent has no other sources of income or wealth, and that he cannot save
or borrow. The agent’s intertemporal discount factor is denoted by  ∈ (0 1).
The principal’s incentive scheme is such that if output is low, she pays the agent a basic
wage . If output is high, she pays the agent  + , where  ≥ 0 is an added bonus. The
basic wage  must sustain an agent who exerts eﬀort until the next harvest:  ≥  + .
When output is high the principal retains the agent. The agent is also retained when output
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is low and the signal indicates that the state of nature is bad ( = ). But if output is
low and the signal indicates that the state of nature is good, the principal may dismiss the
agent and replace him with another. For simplicity, we assume that the principal employs a
non-probabilistic dismissal strategy, that is, the dismissal probability  satisfies:  ∈ {0 1}.9
Thus, there are only two types of contracts:  = 0 and  = 1 If the agent is dismissed, then
the principal incurs a fixed cost   0 that represents the cost of dismissing the agent and
the present value of lost output while recruiting and training a new agent.
The contract strikes the optimal balance between the use of the carrot () and the
stick (). We refer to the contract where  = 0 as the ‘pure-carrot’ contract, and to the
contract where  = 1 as the ‘stick-and-carrot’ contract, and denote this pair of contracts
with subscripts  and , respectively. Under the pure-carrot contract, the agent is never
dismissed and is incentivized only through bonuses. Under the stick-and-carrot contract,
the agent is dismissed whenever output is low but the signal is good ( =   = ), which
occurs with probability  = (1− )(1− ) if the agent exerts high eﬀort.
The expected cost of including the stick in the contract, , is thus decreasing with trans-
parency . We assume that the dismissal cost  is suﬃciently high to preclude the possibility
that the agent will be dismissed whenever output is low, irrespective of the signal, and thus
to guarantee that suﬃciently low transparency renders dismissal too costly and results in a
‘pure carrot’ regime. In particular, we assume that   ˆ =  (1− 2) (1− ). Thus, a
low  in a high transparency region would reinforce the choice of a ‘stick and carrot’ contract.
The principal chooses  ≥ 0  ≥  +  and  ∈ {0 1} to maximize  = ( − ) +
(1 − ) −  − , subject to providing the agent with the incentive to exert eﬀort. The
following proposition describes how the optimal contract depends on the precision of the
public signal , that is, on the transparency of production.
Proposition. If   ˆ then the optimal contract selected by the principal has the
following properties:
1. the agent’s basic wage is set at its lowest possible value:  = + 
2. There exists a threshold ˆ ∈ (05 1) such that:
if   ˆ the optimal contract is a pure carrot contract:  = 0, and  = ;
if   ˆ the optimal contract is a stick and carrot’ contract:  = 1, and  =

³
1− 
1−(+−2)
´
;
if  = ˆ, then both contracts above are optimal.
The proof of this proposition is provided in Appendix 1.10
9In online Appendix C we consider the case where the dismissal probability is unrestricted:  ∈ [0 1].
10By Malthusian considerations, if farmers’ expected income exceeds the subsistence level, we should
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2.1.1 Discussion
We illustrate the results of this proposition in a graph (Figure 1) for a simple calibration.
We set:  = 11,  = 06 and  = 08, so that a bad harvest with a significantly lower crop
occurs about once every five years, and the expected crop size of each plot is set to one:
( ) =  + (1 − ) = 1.11 To be consistent with tenants’ output share of about two
thirds and with the relatively high cost of maintaining a family throughout the year, we set
the subsistence cost to  = 05 and the eﬀort cost to  = 01, thus making the basic wage
 = 06. Given an interest rate (in grain) of one third, as was customary in the ancient
world, we set  = 075. Finally, we set  = 2, so that the present value cost of dismissing
and replacing an agent is two expected crops.12
Figure 1. Periodic expected income as a function of signal accuracy
In this figure, the agent’s expected income  as a function of accuracy  is depicted
by the lower solid line. Total expected income  +  is depicted by the upper solid line;
and the diﬀerence between these two lines represents the principal’s expected income. The
expect the farming population to grow. In Online Appendix F we close the model as far as population
size is concerned by assuming that any excess workers from the rural sector, including dismissed agents, are
employed outside of farming, where the wage is low (particularly during famines) and does not guarantee
reproduction.
11One should think of this unit as representing an annual net output of about 1.5 tons of grain, after
deduction of the grain that is needed for seed (about 15 percent of the crop) and expected spoilage in
storage (about 10-20 percent). For a more elaborate attempt to calibrate early Near Eastern farming see
Hunt (1987).
12With these parameters ˆ  05 is achieved already with  = 048. However, in the version of the model
in which the dismissal probability is continuous, (online Appendix D), a higher  is required for obtaining a
range of ˆ  05 in which  = 0 is optimal. Thus, for consistency, we set  = 2.
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figure clearly identifies the two regimes: ‘pure-carrot’ and ‘stick-and-carrot,’ and the switch
between them at the critical transparency level ˆ.
If the economy is less transparent (  ˆ), the principal optimally refrains from ever
dismissing the agent. In this case, the contract is socially eﬃcient (since expected output is
1) and the expected income of both the principal and the agent is independent of . In this
pure-carrot regime the expected income of the agent, , and the principal, , are:
 = + 2 and  = ( − ) + − 2 −
and their combined expected income is: ( − ) + .
In contrast, in the stick-and-carrot regime, when   ˆ:
 = + 2 − 
1− (+  − 2)  and
 = ( − ) + −− 2 + 
1− (+  − 2) − 
and the expected total income is:
 +  = ( − ) + − 
The expected total income reveals that the stick-and-carrot contract is socially ineﬃcient.
This is because it entails an expected loss of , since the agent may be dismissed even though
he works diligently. The eﬃciency loss  declines as accuracy improves, and at the limit,
when the signal is accurate ( = 1), the stick-and-carrot regime becomes socially eﬃcient.
The principal’s payoﬀ is continuous at the threshold of transparency ˆ and increases with
 thereafter. The gains to the principal from a rise in  in the latter range are derived both
from a rise in total income and from a decline in the agent’s income. Indeed, it is the agent
who bears the entire burden of the stick-and-carrot regime: at the threshold accuracy, ˆ, his
expected income  drops discretely by the expected cost of dismissal (ˆ). Beyond that
threshold, his expected per-period income declines with .
Comparing the outcome when the signal fully discloses the state of nature ( = 1) with the
outcome when the signal is highly inaccurate (  ˆ) is revealing. In both cases the diligent
agent is never dismissed and the economy is eﬃcient. However, the distribution of income
is quite diﬀerent. The agent’s income above subsistence falls from  − ( = ) =  (= 01
in the example) in the range of the opaque signal to  − ( = ) =  − [1− (1− )]
(= 003) when  = 1, as the bonus that is required to dissuade the agent from shirking is
reduced to a minimum.13
13When the agent is very patient ( =1), his utility from employment in agriculture dissipates entirely.
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These results confirm that when transparency is suﬃciently low, the agent-tenant is
never dismissed and could be considered a de facto owner of the land that he cultivates. In
contrast, when transparency is suﬃciently high, the farmer may be evicted and thus cannot
be considered to have ownership rights to the land. In this range, an increase in transparency
implies that the probability of (wrongful) dismissal () declines, so that expected cost of
including a stick in the contract decreases. This enables the principal to rely more on the
stick of dismissal and less on the carrot of bonus payments. This entails a correspondingly
smaller share of output for the tenant and an increase in the revenue appropriated by the
state. The eﬀect of increased transparency on the optimal combination of the stick and
carrot is robust and does not depend on our specific modeling assumptions. It reflects the
logic that the credible threat of using a stick reduces the cost of incentivizing the agent with
a carrot.
One may argue that the principal has an incentive to renege, by avoiding paying the
bonus to the agent, or, alternatively, by failing to dismiss the agent when this is called for,
and negotiate ex-post in order to avoid the cost of dismissal. We have in mind, though, a
patient principal who faces many agents, repeatedly. Informally, we envision that the agents
are likely to believe that if the principal reneges once, even if on one agent only, she is likely
to continue doing so in the future and on other agents. Under these circumstances, the
principal’s commitment to the contract becomes credible, since reneging would render her
unable to incentivize agents by using the carrot or the stick.14
2.2 A Two-Level Hierarchy Model
This subsection provides a key extension of the basic model by incorporating both landlord-
farmer relationships and those between the ruler and intermediary oﬃcials. This extension
has important implications for the study of state concentration and the power structure
between the center and the periphery. Our main conclusion is that if farming activity is
suﬃciently transparent, not only to the local elite but also to the center, the intermediary
retains a smaller share of the revenue and is subject to dismissal. If, however, farming
activity is suﬃciently opaque to the king, the local oﬃcial (governor) retains autonomy and
14We address the concern over ineﬃcient costly dismissal further in online Appendix D, where we consider
a more complex contract-form in which the principal warns the agent a number of times (determined en-
dogenously) upon suspected shirking, before final dismissal. The qualitative results of the model regarding
the eﬀect of transparency q on the optimal contract are unchanged in both extensions. A related concern is
that the contractual relationship could terminate for reasons other than dismissal upon suspected shirking.
But as long as contracts last for more than one season this should not change the qualitative results of our
model. One could extend it by adding a parameter for an exogenous probability of separation: the higher
that probability, the less eﬀective the stick of dismissal.
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a larger share of revenue. We also introduce here an alternative depiction of the moral
hazard problem that is more likely to apply to the relations between local elite and the
center: misreporting tax collection.15
We assume now a two-tier case, where each plot is located within a district, and where
oﬃcials at the district level mediate between the tenant-farmer and the king. This two-tier
case can easily be extended to add more tiers. We attach subscripts 1 or 2 to the variables
at each level of the hierarchy, from the bottom up.
Two independent state variables are assumed to determine the state of nature in each plot
of land: 1 ∈ {} is plot specific, and 2 ∈ {} is district specific. The plot specific
state can be thought of as injury to the tenant during the critical harvest time, or damage due
to localized flood or fire. The district specific state would be something aﬀecting the entire
district, such as widespread drought or blight. We denote the probability that each plot of
land is in a plot-specific good state by 1 ∈ (0 1), and the corresponding probability for each
district by 2 ∈ (0 1). We assume that the plot-specific states are independent across plots
within a district, and independent also of the district state. As in the basic model, output
in each plot can be either low or high: 1 ∈ {11} and the agent’s eﬀort can be either
low or high:  ∈ { }. Plot output is assumed to be high if and only if the agent exerts
high eﬀort and both the plot’s and district’s states of nature are good (1 = 2 = ), which
pertains with probability 12.
The district specific state of nature, 2, is revealed to both the farmer and the governor
after the farmer’s eﬀort decision is made. In addition, if the district specific state is good
(2 = ), then the governor receives plot-specific signals 1 ∈ { } for each plot in the
district. These signals are accurate with probability 1 ∈ [05 1] and are (conditionally)
independent across plots. The relations between the district governor and the farmers under
her control are just as in the basic model. The contract selected by the governor will thus
have the same structure as before: it specifies a basic wage 1 =  + , a bonus 1 if
output is high, and a dismissal probability 1 ∈ {0 1} at a cost of 1 to the governor,
if output is low (1 = 1) but both the district’s state and the plot’s signal are good
(2 = 1 = ). Thus, subject to the farmer exerting high eﬀort, he is dismissed with
probability: 11 = (1− 1) 2 (1− 1) 1. That is, the governor’s maximization problem is
a variant of the principal’s problem in the basic model, in which 12 substitutes for  as the
probability of high output upon high eﬀort, and the probability of dismissal is 11 instead
of . Thus, the governor chooses a pure-carrot contract (1 = 0) if transparency is below
15Our theory of state hierarchy is consistent with Olson’s (1993) non-functional approach: hierarchy serves
as part of a uni-directional extraction mechanism, and does not serve in the management of downstream
activities, as is customarily depicted.
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some threshold, 1  ˆ1, and a stick-and-carrot contract if 1  ˆ1. Above ˆ1, the expected
income of the governor is increasing with 116
We also assume that the number of plots in each district, 1, is suﬃciently large so that
the total revenue obtained by the district governor can be substituted by its expected value.
The governor’s revenue is then limited to two possible outcomes, depending on the district-
specific state of nature 2: 2 in a bad year (2 = ) and 2 in a good year (2 = ),
where:
2 = 1 [1 − (+ )] 
2 = 2(1) = 1 [1(1 − 1 − 1) + 1 − (1− 1)(1− 1)11 − (+ )] 
The parameters 1 and 1 are those selected by the governor (as a function of 1). As in the
basic model, beyond a threshold ˆ1, the good-year revenue 2 is increasing in 1
For the relations between the king and the district governor, we employ a variant of our
basic model in which, instead of possibly exerting low eﬀort, the governor may hide some
output in good years and report to the king 2 instead of 2. At this level of the hierarchy
we assume an information structure analogous to the one in the basic model. The king does
not know the specific states 2 for any of the districts, but he receives an independent signal
2 ∈ { } about each of the district states, whose accuracy is denoted by the probability
2 ∈ [05 1]
The king is assumed to employ a two-edged incentive scheme analogous to the one above:
a bonus 2 if the governor reports collecting 2, and dismissal (at a cost of 2 to the king) if
the governor’s report is 2, but the signal 2 indicates that the district harvest is expected
to be high. The king thus chooses 2 ≥ 0 and 2 ∈ {0 1} to maximize:
2 = 
2≥02∈{01}
2(2 − 2) + (1− 2)[2 − (1− 2)22]
subject to providing the governor with the incentive to report truthfully.
The details of the solution to this problem are very similar to the solution to the basic
model, and are reported in Appendix 2. Once again, the balance of power between the king
and the district governor depends on the transparency of the district economy to the king, 2.
When local conditions are suﬃciently opaque to the king, the intermediary governor enjoys
substantial autonomy in that she retains a (relatively large) fixed part of her collected revenue
and always keeps her position. But if the transparency of the local provincial economy to
16The corresponding bonus payments are: 1 = 12 under ‘pure carrot’ and 1 =
(12) [1− 1211 (1− 1(1− 2)− 12(1 + 1 − 211))] under ‘stick and carrot’. If 2 = 1, this
is identical to the analogous expressions under the basic model.
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the king is suﬃciently high, then the governor is subject to dismissal and retains a relatively
lower share of the revenue collected.
3 APPLICATION: THEMAJORCIVILIZATIONSOF
THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST
Our theory provides the following predictions that link transparency to institutions. Accord-
ing to the basic model:
(1) When farming is locally transparent, farmers do not own the land they cultivate;
(2) When farming conditions are more transparent, the state’s capacity to tax is higher
and the inequality between the elite and the farming population is greater.
And, according to the hierarchical extension of the model:
(3) When farming is less transparent to the central state, local lords retain autonomy
and higher income.
In this section we demonstrate that these three predictions are consistent with the insti-
tutions that prevailed in the three major civilizations of the ancient Near East during the late
fourth to the second millennia BCE: Northern (upper) Mesopotamia, Southern Mesopotamia
(Babylonia, Sumer), and Egypt. Naturally, we do not pretend that our simple theory can
explain all the institutional diﬀerences between these civilizations, nor that our theory is the
only one that addresses these diﬀerences.
These three civilizations were listed above in accordance with their age, but are reviewed
below in reverse order. Intensive agriculture was first adopted in the highlands of southern
Anatolia and northern Mesopotamia in the seventh millennium BCE. Agriculture was ad-
opted in the alluvial planes of Southern Mesopotamia and in the Nile Valley only two and
three millennia later, respectively. It was in Sumer, however, that the first major city-states
were formed in the fourth millennium (Liverani 2006). But the first central territorial state
was formed in Egypt, in about 3000 BCE, starting from a core in Upper (southern) Egypt
(Kemp 2006). The rapidity of the formation of a central state, and its subsequent stability,
are among the key features that distinguish between ancient Egypt and Southern Mesopot-
amia, leading Baines and Yoﬀee (1998, 268) to conclude “the two civilizations are profoundly
diﬀerent.”
Trigger (2003) and other scholars note multiple distinguishing features between these
ancient civilizations. One of them is land tenure arrangements. In Egypt the land nom-
inally belonged to the King, and in southern Mesopotamia land was typically owned by
the temples and the urban elite. In both regions land was thus cultivated by tenants; but
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in Northern Mesopotamia land was mostly owner-cultivated. Another major distinguishing
feature concerns the role of cities. Fortified city-states existed in pre-dynastic Egypt, but
Egyptian cities ceased to be fortified after the formation of the central state and played a
limited role as administrative centers. This led Wilson (1960) to characterize Ancient Egypt
as “a civilization without cities.” In contrast, for most of the time up to the first millennium
BCE, the alluvial plains of southern Mesopotamia were ruled by rival, fortified city-states
that retained their independence and resisted repeated attempts to unify Mesopotamia un-
der a central state. This led Adams (1981) to characterize southern Mesopotamia as “the
Heartland of Cities.” The highlands of Northern Mesopotamia on the other hand gave rise
to more limited city-states.
We now review each of these three civilizations separately, and demonstrate how the
geographical features and resulting transparency of agriculture in each region can account
for their distinctive institutional characteristics. To summarize, we argue that ancient Egypt
occupies a polar extreme, with farming that was highly transparent both at the local and the
global levels. Northern Mesopotamia is closer to the other extreme, with low transparency
at both the local and the global levels.17 Southern Mesopotamia, we suggest, presents an
intermediate case, being comparatively transparent at the local level, but quite opaque to
any potential central state.
3.1 Egypt
The Nile flows northwards, receiving its water mainly from the early-summer monsoon rains
in eastern Africa. As a result, it surges in summer, at which time it floods the narrow river
valley in Egypt. The Egyptian basin irrigation system was based on lateral dikes across the
river valley, constructed to retain the flood water. The trapped water soaked the land and
deposited nutrients for about two months, before it was drained back to the Nile, in time for
the sowing of the staple cereals (mostly barley). The moisture trapped in the soil was the
sole source of water during the growing season. Harvest was in late March, before the hot
winds could parch the grain stalks and cause the kernels to disperse. This form of farming
within the Nile Valley originated at the southern tip of Upper Egypt in the fifth millennium
BCE, from where the Egyptian central state subsequently emerged.18 The homogeneity of
17Agriculture in Northern Mesopotamia was, however, significantly less opaque than in the more arid
regions of the Ancient Near East. Noy-Meir (1973) demonstrates the extreme eﬀects of spatial variations in
micro-climate and terrain quality on the heterogeneity of desert plant populations.
18For brevity, we focus on the Nile Valley, thus avoiding the Nile delta and the Fayum depression. The basin
irrigation system prevailed with surprisingly minor variations for about five millennia, until the construction
of the first Aswan Damn in the early twentieth century. Willcocks (1899) and Butzer (1976) provide detailed
descriptions of this system.
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the land within each basin implied very high local transparency.
Since few details about tenancy arrangements in ancient Egypt have survived, historians
often employ evidence from the more recent past. In describing district life in Egypt from
the medieval period up to the nineteenth century, Baer (1969, 17) contends that it was
characterized by three phenomena: (a) the village head periodically redistributed land among
the peasants; (b) the village inhabitants were collectively responsible for tax payments;
(c) the village as a whole was responsible for maintaining irrigation infrastructure and for
providing labor for public works. Eyre (1997, 378) and Eyre (1999, 51-52) similarly maintains
that in ancient Egypt, farmers did not have secure tenure and the village community as a
whole was responsible for paying taxes. The village head exercised tight control over village
land and could reassign fields as he saw fit, even if by custom the same fields were annually
assigned to the same farmer, or to his heir.19
This description supports our prediction that the threat of dismissal (or relocation) of
individual farmers was a widely used incentive device in Egypt and that land was not owned
by the cultivating farmers. Indeed, the prevailing notion in ancient Egypt was that the entire
land belonged to the Pharaoh (Baines and Yoﬀee 1998, 206), even if this coexisted in various
periods with a practice by which much of the land was de facto owned by the temples, by
various lay organizations, and by powerful individuals (Manning 2003, 65-98). That is, even
when land in the Nile Valley was privately held, it was owned by absentee landlords who did
not work the fields.20
This state of aﬀairs is consistent with prediction (1). The high local transparency of
farming eliminated the main disadvantage of absentee land ownership, and left peasants
vulnerable by denying them an information advantage. Significantly, in the few known cases
where private land lease documents survived from antiquity, the contracts were for one year
only (Hughes 1952), providing further support for our proposed mechanism that tenants
were constantly under the threat of eviction.21
19Eyre (1997, 1999) contends that the divorce between land-ownership and actual farming was endemic
to Egypt and persisted until the mid-twentieth century. According to Baer (1969, 62-78), even the major
agrarian reforms during the nineteenth century, which gave land title to the cultivating peasants, ended
with much of the land reverting back to large absentee landlords after the small cultivators failed to pay the
required taxes.
20Hughes (1952, 1-2) summarizes that in the first two millennia of the historic period (the third and second
millennia BCE) there was never “a large body of small landholders who managed and worked their plots
themselves . . . the lowest classes were largely serfs on the domains of Pharaoh, the wealthy and the
temples.”
21Another feature that reduced the advantages of long-term leases in the Nile Valley was that land fertility
was sustained by the Nile’s annual deposits, so that land could not in eﬀect be over-exploited. In addition,
agrarian capital investment was by way of dikes and local canals that were constructed and maintained
15
Transparency should not be confused with predictability. The fluctuations in the Nile’s
annual inundation level were substantial and caused significant unpredictable annual vari-
ations in crop output. Particularly high inundation would break the lateral dikes and flood
villages, causing as much of a threat as very low inundation levels. The timing, length and
severity of the hot spring winds at harvest time contributed to the uncertainty. However,
in any given year, the conditions that farmers faced were fairly homogeneous within each
irrigation basin system, and also across basin systems. As a result, farming activity was
highly transparent not only locally, but also to the central government. The Nile’s annual
peak inundation was recorded as early as the third millennium BCE (Kemp 2006, 64). Nilo-
meters that measured the inundation level were set up along the Nile, and it appears that
the Pharaohs used this information as a control device. Cooper (1976, 366) describes the
taxation of Egyptian agriculture in the middle ages: “Agriculture was so well regulated in
Egypt that, on the basis of the Nile flood recorded by the Nilometer, the government knew
in advance what revenue to anticipate.” In particular, “The height of the Nile flood determ-
ined how much and in what manner the tax assignments were made in each district.” We
conjecture that this was the case also in antiquity.22
The Nile’s global transparency enabled the Pharaohs to employ a stick-intensive incentive
scheme towards the district governors, and down the chain of middlemen who remitted taxes
from the periphery to the center. That is, consistently with predictions (2) and (3), the
high transparency of farming helps explains why the Pharaohs were able to run a lean state
bureaucracy and to siphon oﬀ a substantial share of the tax revenue, without engaging in
direct control. In turn, it explains why the provincial centers retained so little independent
power. This is consistent with Eyre’s (1994, 74) summary: “The crucial factor for the
central power was its ability to enforce fiscal demands and political control. . . . [P]ower
lay in control over the ruling class . . . not in the detailed administration of the individual
peasantry.” Indeed, at least in the early Old Kingdom period, the positions of governors and
state bureaucrats were by a revocable appointment, and nonhereditary.23 The non-secure
status of these state bureaucrats is closely related to the relative weakness of the cities in the
diﬀerent districts. These cities essentially remained administrative centers, without amassing
communally. The homogeneity of farm land within each basin also reduced the importance of plot specific
skills, implying that the cost of replacing an agent was not high, reinforcing the adoption of dismissal as part
of the incentive scheme.
22The transparency of Egyptian farming was due also to the relative ease of monitoring farming activity in
real time by inspectors traveling along the Nile. Kemp (2006, 254-6) provides evidence for such a monitoring
expedition from 1140 BCE.
23Baines and Yoﬀee (1998, 206) state: “The king’s most powerful influence was probably on the elite.
Their status and wealth depended on him – often on his personal favor and caprice.”
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substantial independent wealth to threaten the predominance of the center.
The high transparency at all levels of the state hierarchy can also explain the rapidity of
the formation of a strong central state in Egypt, and its remarkable subsequent stability.
3.2 Southern Mesopotamia
As in Egypt, farming in arid Southern Mesopotamia relied entirely on riverine irrigation.
The water regime in the Tigris and the Euphrates, however, is very diﬀerent from that in
Egypt. Both these rivers flow southward, and are fed by the winter rains and by spring
melting snow in the mountains of modern Turkey and Iran. The long distance between these
mountain ranges and Southern Mesopotamia meant that water levels were low in October-
December when irrigation was most needed, but high in the harvest season in late spring
(Adams 1981, 3-6; Postgate 1994, 178; Wilkinson 2013). This mismatch prevented irrigation
by flooding, as in Egypt. Cereals were cultivated on the outer slopes of levees, including the
levees of abandoned courses of the rivers. An extended canals system was required to deal
with the water shortage in the cultivation season: capturing water upstream and directing
it towards the fields. Furthermore, since water quantity was insuﬃcient to irrigate all the
arable land, control mechanisms were required to distribute the water.24 The swelling of the
rivers in the spring posed another major threat of flooding the ripe fields at harvest time,
and had to be overcome by diverting excess water into the marshy flood plain at the lower
end of the cultivation zone (Adams 1981, 245; Wilkinson 2003, 89; Wilkinson 2013).25
These major problems apparently delayed the adoption of extensive agriculture in South-
ern Mesopotamia well after agriculture flourished in Northern Mesopotamia, and after ir-
rigation systems were established in southwest Iran (Wilkinson 2003, 72-76). In addition to
the intricate canal system that overcame these problems, agriculture in Southern Mesopot-
amia benefitted from another innovation: the cultivation in deep furrows, plowed by oxen,
in narrow and long fields that sloped down from the feeding canal towards the marshy plain
(Liverani 2006). This method enabled conservation of seed and water, and also helped divert
the saline topsoil away from the plants.
Farming conditions in Southern Mesopotamia were complex (Wilkinson 2013). Even
24Adams (1981, 6) estimates that due to the shortage of water, only 8,000-12,000 square kilometers could
be cultivated out of a potential that Wilkinson (2003, 76) estimates to be about 50,000 square kilometers.
The shortage of water at the critical cultivation season is evidenced by the use of irrigation fees, as early
as the late third millennium BCE. This underscores the power available to those upstream who could deny
water.
25Unlike in Egypt, the soil nutrients were not replenished automatically and salt was not washed away.
The need to replenish land fertility and the shortage of water combined to establish a system of relatively
frequent land fallow.
17
fields within the same zone could vary in quality, depending on how high they were above the
saline water table in the adjacent marsh. The overriding factor though was the dependency
of cultivation on rationed water, which was controlled upstream, and which could have been
directed elsewhere. Farmers were thus completely dependent on the local elite who controlled
the flow of water at various canal junctures. In turn, the elaborate canal system provided the
local elite with significant means of control and with information on the state of agriculture.26
Accordingly, we categorize farming activity in Southern Mesopotamia as highly trans-
parent to the local elite. Consistent with prediction (1), we contend that this transparency
explains why owner-cultivated farming was practically nonexistent in SouthernMesopotamia.
As in Egypt, cultivation was conducted by sharecroppers, who were overseen by a hierarchy
of intermediaries, under the ultimate control of dominant elite families who resided in the
urban centers and controlled each city’s temple (Renger 1995; Liverani 2006).27 In accord
with prediction (2), this high local transparency explains why powerful early city-states were
able to form and to persist in Southern Mesopotamia. Indeed, once irrigation agriculture
was introduced, it led to relatively rapid development of civilization. More than thirty ma-
jor city-states have been identified in Southern Mesopotamia in the late-fourth and third
millennia BCE. Writing originated in about 3200- 3100 BCE in the largest of these cities,
Uruk, when its population reached about twenty thousand (Yoﬀee 2005, 43).
At the same time, the complexity of the irrigation system required skilled local man-
agers with a “thorough knowledge of local conditions on a day-to-day basis” (Hunt 1987,
172). Unlike the case of Egypt, the local managing elite in Southern Mesopotamia were thus
indispensable and irreplaceable. In other words, we interpret farming activity in Southern
Mesopotamia as rather opaque to any distant central government. Consistent with predic-
tion (3), this opacity explains why the local elite in Southern Mesopotamia were extremely
resilient, and why strong cities were one of the most distinctive features of Mesopotamian
civilization. Thus, even when an early city-state in Southern Mesopotamia managed to
conquer a competing city-state, it still needed the cooperation of the elite of the subjug-
ated city to obtain on-going tax revenue from the conquered territory. It was the specific
knowledge possessed by the local elites, we contend, that assured the autonomy of Southern
Mesopotamian cities.
This helps explain why several aggressive attempts to unify Southern Mesopotamia under
one of the rival city-states in the third and second millennia BCE ended in failure after a
26One may argue that such direct control provides power of coercion that goes beyond mere information.
In our framework, however, the state is assumed to possess the power to coerce. Thus, implicitly, we view
control as a form of transparency.
27As in Egypt, in addition to remitting farm output to the elite, the peasants were required to provide
compulsory labor services (corvée) to repair and extend irrigation infrastructure, and also for temple lands.
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relatively short period – in marked contrast to the quick and durable unification of Egypt.
The rival city states of SouthernMesopotamia fought each other periodically for a millennium
before they were first consolidated under Sargon of Akkad in about 2350 BCE. However,
Sargon’s central state lasted less than two centuries and started to disintegrate well before
that. In about 2100 BCE another territorial state was formed, under the third dynasty of the
city of Ur. This highly oppressive and bureaucratic state lasted only one century before it too
collapsed. The next territorial state was established by Hammurabi of Babylon in 1790-1760
BCE, but it weakened substantially under his heirs, and collapsed by about 1600 BCE. Thus,
until the first millennium, Mesopotamia was ruled most of the time by rival city-states, with
only brief intermittent periods of a central territorial state.28 Our explanation of this historic
pattern is consistent with Yoﬀee’s (2005) description of the fate of Sargon’s earliest central
state. According to Yoﬀee, Sargon was well aware of the intermediation problem. When he
ascended to power he sought “to disenfranchise the old landed aristocracy” (p. 37). But
after conquering the diverse city states in Southern Mesopotamia, he ruled them through
appointed “royal oﬃcials, who served alongside the traditional rulers of the conquered city-
states” (p. 142). It was this “uneasy sharing of power . . . [that] led to a power struggle”
and to the ultimate demise of Sargon’s territorial states (Yoﬀee 1995, 292-293, 2005, 143).
Furthermore, not only that the city-states in Southern Mesopotamia resisted subjugation
to outside power, they also resisted local despots. These city-states were typically governed
by hereditary kings by the rule of law, and with councils of elders and assemblies at their
side, consisting of members of landed elite, merchants and artisans (Van de Mieroop 2013).
We suggest that this pattern of governance prevailed since would-be despots were unable to
raise suﬃcient revenue to sustain coercive power without the cooperation of the local elite
who possessed specific information on the intricate countryside and the economy.29
3.3 Northern Mesopotamia
Farming started in Northern Mesopotamia long before it was adopted in Southern Meso-
potamia. And urbanization was identified there already in the late fifth and early fourth
28The Neo-Assyrian Empire in the first millennium BCE devised various administrative methods to subject
conquered states. In particular, they adopted bi-directional deportations, in which the elite of a conquered
state were deported and replaced by people from elsewhere. But, significantly, even under the Neo-Assyrian,
Neo-Babylonian and Persian empires, the elites in the cities in southern Mesopotamia retained much of their
former autonomy (Van de Mieroop 1997, 128-139, 2013).
29Sinopoli et al. (2016, 390) identify an even more pronounced pattern of distributed power in the gov-
ernance of city-states in antiquity in diverse regions of the world (including the Indus Valley, Greece and
Western Africa). But rather than focus on what handicapped would-be despots, they attribute the pervas-
iveness of this pattern to “both ideological commitments and material benefits to the actors involved.”
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millennia BCE; but declined in the later part of the fourth millennium.30 The geographic
conditions in the highlands of Northern Mesopotamia are quite diﬀerent from those in river-
ine Southern Mesopotamia and Egypt. Agriculture was mostly rain fed. Due to the uncertain
and idiosyncratic nature of rainfall, and to the relative unevenness of the terrain, farming
was comparatively opaque even at the local level.31 Wilkinson (1994, 2003, 210) concludes
that the settlement pattern in Northern Mesopotamia was characterized by a large scattering
of roughly equivalent, nucleated units. Each unit was administered by a central settlement,
with a radius of control of about five kilometers, determined by the “constraining eﬀect of
land transport and the convenience of being within one day’s round trip of the center” (1994,
503).
Without disputing this observation, we take issue with Wilkinson’s explanation that this
pattern was due to the fact that no center was able to dominate another, since none had an
“overwhelming situational or demographic advantage” (2003, 210). By the winner-takes-all
(increasing returns to scale) nature of violent conflicts, a priori advantage is not a prerequisite
for the formation of larger territorial states under city leaders who happen to defeat their
neighbors. From our perspective, the key to the nucleated pattern of semi-autonomous
administrative units in early Northern Mesopotamia was the inability of the winner of any
such territorial conflict to extract on-going revenue from distant conquered lands. In a more
pronounced version of the situation in Southern Mesopotamia, and consistently with our
third prediction, we propose that the localized nature of the early city-states in this region
was due to the opacity of farming activity that limited the span of control of its urban
centers.32
The relatively low transparency of farming in Northern Mesopotamia, even at the local
level, can also explain the drastically diﬀerent land tenure regime in that region. In contrast
to the tenancy pattern in Egypt and Southern Mesopotamia, owner-operated farming was
prevalent in Northern Mesopotamia from early on. Cuneiform documents from the mid-
second millennium BCE from Nuzi (near modern Mosul) reveal that while the local kings
and the elite owned large estates, the temples did not possess economic power or land, and
30The large size of these early cities and the architectural remains of the dwellings suggest that these
cities were inhabited not only by the elite, but also by the farming peasants (Ur 2010). This pattern of
inhabitance is consistent with the presumption of the elite’s inability to raise the needed resources to secure
the countryside from banditry, which forced the peasants to seek refuge within the walls of the central city,
and with the relatively small territorial span of these early city-states.
31See Wilkinson (1994) and Jas (2000).
32The costly transport of the crop tribute to the center over land was another major contributing factor
for the limited span of early potential states in Northern Mesopotamia, in comparison with riverine Southern
Mesopotamia and Egypt, where in-kind tax revenue was transported by rafts and boats.
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much land was owned by nuclear families who worked their patrimonial property. The Nuzi
evidence also reveals that land ownership in Northern Mesopotamia was in a constant state
of flux. Small landholders regularly lost title of their land to rich families through debt and
sale under duress (Zaccagnini 1999; Jas 2000). However, the persistence of owner-occupied
farming indicates that the process of land consolidation must have been matched by an
opposing process by which large, presumably less eﬃcient, estates were gradually dissolved.
The prevalence of owner-cultivated private farming in Northern Mesopotamia is consistent
with prediction (1) that low transparency makes tenancy less profitable to absentee owners.33
4 RELATED LITERATURE
Since the body of related literature is large, we shall review only the leading alternative
theories on the pattern of state governance in the Ancient Near East and some related
general theories on statehood.34
We start with Wittfogel’s (1957) influential hydraulic theory of “oriental despotism,”
according to which large-scale irrigation infrastructure was necessary to realize the agricul-
tural potential in riverine environments. Strong, despotic states are presumed to have been
a prerequisite for constructing and administering these irrigation projects. Wittfogel’s many
critics pointed out, however, that the irrigation systems in ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia
(and elsewhere) were constructed communally, prior to the emergence of a strong central
state. Moreover, even after a central state emerged, these irrigation systems were managed
locally, rather than from the center. Due to the cogency of these counter-arguments, Wittfo-
gel’s theory is now considered defunct. But this leaves unexplained the correlation that he
pointed out between riverine environments and strong ancient states. Our theory explains
this correlation by reversing the direction of causality in Wittfogel’s theory. It is not that a
despotic state was required to construct and to operate irrigation systems, but rather that
irrigation-based agriculture provided transparency and facilitated state control.35
33Jas (2000) quotes Warriner (1948, 21, 104), who noted that the diﬀerent land tenure regimes between
Northern and Southern Mesopotamia in antiquity persisted to the modern era: “In the north, the forms of
tenure are similar to those of Syria, with a class of small proprietors taking some but not all, the land. In
the south large owners or sheiks own virtually all the land, letting it to share-tenants, through a series of
intermediary lessees.”
34With regard to the related literature on property rights, we only note that in our framework rights to
land do not arise spontaneously (as in Demsetz 1967), but are granted by an authoritarian government (as
in North 1981).
35Billman (2002) provides additional evidence from an early irrigation system in the Moche valley in the
arid northern coast of Peru in 400 BCE-800 CE. He argues that the use of irrigation created an opportunity
for leaders “to control land and the flow of water;” thus enabling them “to finance the creation of centralized,
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An alternative functional theory posits that the early state served a redistributive pur-
pose. Thus, Adams (1981, 244) views the Mesopotamian city-states as having been formed
to cope with uncertainty in farming output, through precautionary storage against years of
shortage: “In the largest sense, Mesopotamian cities can be viewed as an adaptation to the
perennial problem of periodic, unpredictable shortages. They provided concentration points
for the storage of surpluses.” Our framework, however, suggests that the attested extens-
ive inter-annual storage in ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia may have served primarily to
protect the urban elite against revenue shortfalls in years of famine, rather than to aid the
farming population in the countryside.
Probably the most widespread alternative theory is the idea (referred to in our introduc-
tion) that the emergence of the state was due to the increased productivity of agriculture and
to the surplus that was thus created. It is argued that this surplus generated via diverse chan-
nels (such as population pressure, trade, or required protection) a need for government. In an
influential variant of these ideas, Carneiro’s (1970) “environmental circumscription” theory
poses that states emerged only in circumscribed areas that trapped the agrarian population
and restricted its ability to avoid subjugation by fleeing elsewhere. In his comprehensive
study of the history of government, Mann (1986, 38-40, 75-102, 108-115) uses the metaphor
of a “social cage” to explain the success of ancient Egypt and of other early states. Both
Mann (1986) and Allen (1997) argue that Egypt’s success was due to the deserts that isolate
the Nile Valley and inhibited the peasants from avoiding subjugation via out-migration, thus
enabling the state to extract surplus from the farming sector. From our perspective, while
this entrapment theory fits Egypt, it does not adequately explain the institutional diﬀerences
that were examined above, for example, between northern and southern Mesopotamia.
Tilly (1975) oﬀered another influential conflict theory that relates the emergence of cent-
ralized states to their capacity to tax. In seeking to explain the evolution of European states
since the middle-ages, he contends that new military technologies disrupted the international
equilibrium and forced states to consolidate in order to finance ever costlier wars. Tilly fam-
ously stated: “War made the state, and the state made war” (Tilly 1975, 42). Finer (1997)
applied this warfare theory more broadly to explain the history of government, referring to
this positive feedback theory as the “extraction—coercion cycle” (Finer 1997, 15-19).36
It is evident however that warfare theory cannot explain the state’s success in ancient
Egypt, since, as argued for example by Dal Bó, et al. (2015), Egypt’s natural circumscription
insulated it from the outside and implied that once a central state was formed, it was not
hierarchical political organizations;” leading to the formation of an early territorial state.
36Gennaioli and Voth (2015) test Tilly’s theory to argue that tax capacity indeed increased since the
Middle Ages due to the necessity of financing wars.
22
seriously threatened by competing states. This was in contrast to Mesopotamia, where local
rivalries and nomadic banditry were a perennial problem. Stasavage (2010) proposed an
alternative transparency theory — where the transparency is of government activity, rather
than of production — that challenges Tilly’s theory on other grounds. He contends that the
compact geographic span of small pre-modern European city-states generated greater trans-
parency of their governments and enabled these city-states to raise the necessary resources,
via taxes or credit, and thus withstand aggression and retain their independence.
As we see it, the critical element missing in the warfare theory is an explanation of what
enabled a victor to extract ongoing revenue from a conquered territory to make the conquest
viable and long-lasting. In other words, while admitting that fiscal capacity contributes to a
state’s military capacity, we question the general validity of the reverse causal relation that
greater military capacity necessarily increases fiscal capacity. These considerations, though,
highlight that we assume here, as mentioned in the introduction, an isolated state with an
absolute power to coerce; yet without incorporating rivalry between competing polities or
taking into account the resources required to maintain such power and to deter secession.37
Moreover, we have avoided altogether assigning the state with the typical function of
providing public goods, including the maintenance of law and order. We acknowledge in
this respect the contribution of Levi (1988), who considers, as we do, the constraints on
the government’s capacity to tax, but emphasizes how the provision of public goods and
adherence to constitutional constraints may foster cooperative compliance by tax-payers, as
a substitute for the sole reliance on coercion.
Finally, we note that in a companion contribution (Mayshar et al., 2016) we consider both
the emergence of the state and the role of increased productivity, issues that we do not address
here. In that paper we focus on a diﬀerent aspect of the ability to appropriate, contending
that the transforming feature of the Neolithic Revolution which gave rise to social hierarchy
was the increased appropriability of crops, rather than increased productivity. In particular,
we argue and provide empirical support for our claims that even after the adoption of highly
productive agriculture, state institutions did not emerge in regions where farming relied on
non-seasonal roots and tubers that are typically perishable and largely non-appropriable.
Complex hierarchies and state institutions emerged only in regions of the world, such as the
Ancient Near East, where farming relied on seasonal and non-perishable cereal crops, since
such crops require storage from one harvest to the next and are thus highly vulnerable to
appropriation.38
37The literature on these issues is extensive. See most recently Boix (2015).
38Huning and Wahl (2016) provide additional evidence in support of our current transparency theory, and
also for our additional claim about the secondary role of productivity. They extend our present model by
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5 CONCLUSION
Stigler (1961) stated that “knowledge is power.” We apply this maxim to examine how
the extent and the structure of informational asymmetry shaped the institutions of pre-
modern, agricultural state societies. Our overarching contention is that through its eﬀect
on the tax technology, the transparency of production aﬀects the scale of the state, its
hierarchical structure, and land tenure practices. This theory helps explains why ancient
Egypt was rapidly united and was subsequently very stable and highly centralized, while
Sumer remained a complex of competing city-states for several millennia. It also explains why
land in Egypt belonged (at least nominally) to the Pharaoh, while in Southern Mesopotamia
land belonged to the temples and to the elite, and in Northern Mesopotamia there was
substantial owner-occupied farming.
Our environmental theory of early institutions oﬀers a new paradigm for understanding
antiquity, with an emphasis on how diﬀerences in the extent of information asymmetry
aﬀect hierarchical extractive institutions. While we apply our theory to the institutions of
antiquity, we propose that it can be applied to all predominantly agricultural state societies.
More generally, and unrelated to environmental considerations, our theory sheds light on
how production technologies can impact the state’s capacity to tax and shape institutions.
In particular, whereas the prevailing perception is that asymmetry of information hinders
eﬃciency, our framework reveals that the lack of transparency of agents’ activities (‘privacy’)
may in fact be beneficial to them in protecting their freedom, and possibly also in promoting
their material well-being.
viewing spatial homogeneity of soil quality as a proxy for transparency, and relating it to state size, under
the assumption that states’ income determines military spending. Consistent with our theory, they find a
robust positive relationship between observability and size of medieval German territories. They also find
that low observability is correlated with the existence of city-states, and show that the resulting political
fragmentation in the medieval period is recognizable in Germany until today. Moreover, they show that land
productivity does not have a significant eﬀect on the territorial size of these city-states.
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Appendix 1 - Proof of the Proposition
Denote by  the present value of the agent’s utility from employment in agriculture in a
stationary equilibrium where he exerts high eﬀort every period. The normalization that the
agent’s utility upon dismissal is zero implies:
 = [ + −− ] + [1− ] (A1)
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where  = (1− ) (1− ) is the probability of a bad harvest and a good signal, and  is
the probability of dismissal. Solving From (A1):
 ( ) =  + −− 
1−  (1− )  (A2)
The principal selects  ≥ 0,  ≥ +  and  ∈ {0 1} to maximize:
 = max ( − ) + (1− )− −  (A3)
subject to incentivizing the agent to exert high eﬀort:
[+  ] + (1− )[ + (1− )(1− )] +  −−  ≥
[(1− ) + (1− )] + (1− )[ + (1− )(1− )] +  − (A4)
where  =  ( ).
Since  cancels out from (A4), it is optimally set to  =  + , thus confirming (1).
Plugging (A2) into (A4) and simplifying yields the incentive constraint:

µ
1 +

1−  (1− )
¶
≥  (A5)
Part (2) follows from the maximization of (A1) subject to (A5). Because the Principal
sets  as low as possible, the incentive constraint is binding in the optimal solution.
The threshold ˆ, is given by the unique solution in the interval [0,1] to the quadratic
equation ( 0) = ( 1), that can be expressed as:
ˆ(1− ˆ) = (1− )[1− (+ ˆ − 2ˆ)] (A6)
To see that ˆ  05 if   ˆ =  (1− 2) (1− ), note that while the left-hand-side
of (A6) is convex and increasing from zero to infinity as  increases from zero to one, the
right-hand-side is positive and linear in . The threshold ˆ is obtained by requiring that for
ˆ = 05, the right-hand-side (A6) be equal to one.
Finally, the third pure strategy of dismissal of the agent upon observing low output
regardless of the signal is dominated by the pure-carrot contract if   (1− ). Thus,
it is never optimal in the range where   ˆ. ¤
Appendix 2
The incentive constraint for the governor is:
2 ≥ (2 − 2)− 2222
where 22 is the governor’s discounted value of keeping her position. Under the optimal
contract the incentive constraint is binding. Setting the governor’s utility of unemployment
to zero, we obtain, in analogy to (A1):
2 = 22 + [1− 2(1− 2)(1− 2)]22 (B1)
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From (B1) it is possible to solve for 2(2 2) as in (A2), and then to solve explicitly for
the king’s optimal incentive scheme 2 and 2. Thus, subject to parameter restrictions on 2
and 2 that are analogous to those above, there exists a threshold ˆ2  05 such that if district
farming is suﬃciently opaque to the king (2  ˆ2) the governor enjoys a carrot regime, in
which she is autonomous in the sense that she is never dismissed, namely 2 = 0. In this
regime, the king’s per-period revenue is 2 = 2, independently of the state of nature, and
the governor retains 2 = 2 − 2 whenever the district state of nature is good, and zero
otherwise.
On the other hand, when district farming is suﬃciently transparent to the king (2  ˆ2),
a stick-and-carrot regime prevails. Under this regime, the governor is dismissed whenever
the king is led to expect high revenue, on the basis of observing 2 = , but the governor
reports low revenue. This occurs with probability (1− 2)(1− 2). In this regime, following
a similar derivation to the one in the above, 2 = 1 and 2 = (2 − 2)− 222, where:
2 = (2 − 2)
1− 2(+ 2 − 22) 
The king’s expected revenue in this case is:
2 = (2 −2) + 222 − (1− )(1− 2)2
The threshold transparency level ˆ2 is determined by the implicit condition 2 = 2.
As in the basic model, the transparency threshold ˆ2 increases with the cost of dismissal 2
and decreases with the governor’s discount factor 2.
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Appendix A: Hiding Output
In this appendix we consider a variant of the basic model, in which eﬀort
is costless, but the agent may hide output. In particular, the agent may
report that output is low even when it is high. The principal provides the
agent with a bonus  if reported output is high, but may dismiss the agent
( = 1) if the reported output is low and the signal indicates that the state
of nature is good. The basic wage in this case covers subsistence:  = .
An incentive scheme,   0  ∈ {0 1} induces truthful reporting of the
agent if:1
+  ≥ ( − ) + (((1− ) + (1− )) (A1)
where − is the output stolen by the agent when he reports low instead of
high output, and  denotes the present value of the agent’s utility from being
employed in agriculture in a stationary equilibrium with truthful reporting.
The agent’s incentive constraint is binding in the optimal solution (otherwise
the principal can lower the bonus payment ) and so:
 = ( − )−  (A2)
The value function  ( ) associated with truthful reporting (analog of (2)
in the basic model) is:
 ( ) = 
1− (1− )  (A3)
Plugging (A3) into (A2) and simplifying yields an incentive constraint:
 = ( − )
µ
1− 
1−  +  (+ )
¶
 (A4)
1Notice that the incentive constraint is relevant only in case the state of nature is good
and output is high.
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The principal’s objective is:
 = ∈{01}( − ) + − − − (A5)
subject to (A4).
Thus, two types of contracts may be optimal: one with  = 0 (‘pure car-
rot’) and another with  = 1 (‘carrot and stick’). The threshold transparency
level ˆ that determines the level above which the‘carrot and stick’ is optimal
is given by the solution of the following equation (analogous to (4) in the
basic model) that equates the expected profit to the principal under the two
contracts: ˆ
1− ˆ =
(1− )
( − )[1− (+ ˆ − 2ˆ)] (A6)
A pure carrot contract is optimal if   ˆ. It is given by:
 = 0  =  −  and  = ( − )(1− ) (A7)
A stick and carrot contract is optimal if   ˆ. It is given by:
 = 1  = (−)
µ
1− 
1− (+  − 2)
¶
  = ( − )
1− (+  − 2) 
(A8)
These results reveal that the analysis of the main model is qualitatively robust
to this alternative scenario of the moral hazard problem.
Appendix B: Costly Monitoring
Suppose that the model is identical to the basic model except that the
principal can observe a signal  ∈
n
˜ ˜
o
about the agent’s eﬀort at cost
 ≥ 0 (in units of output) instead of on the state of nature as in the basic
model. The accuracy of the signal is  ∈ [12 1], such that:
(˜|) = (˜|) =  ; (˜|) = (˜|) = 1− 
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The case of a perfect monitoring is captured by:  = 1; and the case where
it is uninformative is captured by:  = 12.
As in the basic model,   0 is the periodic cost of exerting high eﬀort,
the agent’s alternative employment outside of agriculture tenancy provides
utility of zero and the agent’s periodic utility,  , when engaged in agriculture
equals his expected income, to be denoted by , less the cost of eﬀort. In
particular, when exerting high eﬀort, this periodic utility is:  =  − .
We denote the present value of the agent’s utility from being employed
in agriculture by  , and denote by  ∈ (0 1) the agent’s discount factor.
The principal is assumed to rely on the following incentive scheme. If
output is high, then the principal retains the agent with certainty and pays
the agent  + , where  ≥ 0 is a bonus payment. If output is low, then the
agent is still paid the basic subsistence wage  = .
When output is low, if the signal indicates that the agent was exerting
high eﬀort ( = ˜), then the principal retains the agent. But if output is
low and the signal indicates that the agent was shirking ( = ˜), then the
principal may dismiss the agent.
We denote by  = 1 the strategy of dismissal upon low output and a signal
indicating low eﬀort:  = ˜ and  = , and retention of the agent otherwise,
and by  = 0 the strategy of always retaining the agent. If the agent is
dismissed, the principal incurs a fixed cost   0 (in units of output). We
assume that this cost is large enough to ensure that it will not be desirable
to dismiss the agent when output is low ( = ) and the signal indicates
high eﬀort.
Thus, the principal can either imply a contract with  = 1 in which he
incurs the monitoring cost , or she can employ a contract with  = 0 and
no monitoring.
Given our normalization that the utility of a dismissed agent is zero, in a
stationary equilibrium the value of the employed agent’s discounted utility,
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when he exerts high eﬀort, has to satisfy:
 = + [1− (| = )] (B1)
For convenience, we denote the probability of a bad harvest and a good
signal by  = (1− ) (1− )  The probability of dismissal upon high eﬀort
is then .  is thus determined by the contract parameters  and  and
the parameters:   and  as follows:
 ( ) = 
1−  (1− )  (B2)
The principal’s objective is to solve for the employment contract that maxi-
mizes her periodic expected payoﬀ, denoted by ,
 = 
≥0∈{01}
( − ) + (1− )− −  − 
subject to providing the agent with incentives to exert high eﬀort (identical
to the basic model):
(+  ) + (1− )[ + (1− )(1− )] +  − 
≥
((1− ) + (1− )) + (1− )[( + (1− )(1− )] + 
where  =  ( ) as in (B2).
Since  =  we can rewrite the principal’s objective function and the
agent’s incentive constraint as follows:
 = max≥0∈[01]  ( − ) + −  − − −  (B-OF)
s.t.
+  ( ) ≥  (B-IC )
Thus, we obtain that modeling monitoring as a (costly) signal on eﬀort,
yields a maximization problem that for  = 0 is identical to the maximiza-
tion problem in the main model. More generally, the larger is  the higher
4
would be the threshold ˆ above which the optimal contract is ‘stick & car-
rot’, without any change in the qualitative results. This indicates that the
larger is  - the more costly it is to obtain a signal on eﬀort as in this model
or on the state of nature, as in the main model - the larger is the range of
parameters for which the solution is ‘pure carrot’. This means that if   0
then the threshold ˆ is strictly larger than 12 for lower values of the cost of
replacement .
Appendix C: Probabilistic Dismissal
In this appendix we consider again the basic model, but we allow the
principal to dismiss the agent upon observation of low output and a good
signal with any probability  ∈ [0 1] as opposed to just  ∈ {0 1} as in
the main text. We recast the principal’s problem as the minimization of
discretionary expenditure:
min∈[01] +  (C1)
subject to the agent’s incentive constraint:
 =
µ
1 +

1− (1− )
¶
≥  (C2)
The agent’s incentive constraint must be binding in the optimal solution.
Plugging the value of  from (C2) into (C1) yields the principal’s objective
function

µ
1− 
1−  +  (+ )
¶
+  (C3)
as a function of  alone.
Diﬀerentiation of the principal’s objective function with respect to 
yields:
−(1− )2 +  (C4)
where  = 1−  + (+ ).
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Inspection of (C3) reveals that the expression on the left of (C3) is convex
in  while the expression on the right is linear and increasing in . Compar-
ison of the values of these two expressions at  = 0 reveals that if
 ≤ (1− )(1− ) + (1− )(1− ) (C5)
then the value of  that maximizes the principal’s objective function (sets
the derivative (C4) equal to zero) is negative. Because  is a probability,
this means that the optimal probability of dismissal in this case is  = 0.
Comparison of the values of these two expressions at  = 1 yields another
condition on  such that the value of  that maximizes the principal’s objec-
tive function is larger than one. Because  is a probability, this means that
the optimal probability of dismissal in this case is  = 1.
Thus, there exist two threshold values  and  such that for    the
optimal  = 0; for    the optimal  = 1; and for  ≤  ≤    the
optimal value of  (obtained from solving the first-order-condition equation
4 = 0) is given by:
 = 1− (+ )
Ãs

(1− ) − 1
!
(C6)
If the right-hand-side of (C5) is larger than 5 or, equivalently,
(1− )
 

1−  (C7)
then   5, which means that the pure carrot contract is optimal for some
values of the accuracy parameter . Inspection of (C7) reveals that this is
the case if the cost of dismissal  is suﬃciently large and/or the agent is
impatient ( is small) so that the threat of dismissal is less eﬀective.
The next figure depicts the optimal dismissal probability  as a function
of transparency  for the same parameters as in the example in the main
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Figure 5: The optimal dismissal probability,  ∈ [0 1], as a function of
transparency 
As in the basic case, the agent’s bonus is maximal when   . In the
range above , as the probability of dismissal increases, the bonus decreases —
since the increased threat of dismissal is used as a substitute incentive device.
The bonus continues to decrease further in the range where   , where the
dismissal probability reaches its upper limit ( = 1). The principal’s net
expected revenue (taking into account the costs of dismissal) is constant
below the threshold  and increases monotonically in  above .
Appendix D: Warning before Dismissal
In this appendix we allow the principal to warn the agent an optimally
chosen number of times when output is low and the signal about the state
of nature is good before actually dismissing the agent. That is, we assume
that the principal optimally selects an integer number  of “bad signals,” or
times at which will observe  =  and  =  before it dismisses the agent.
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The number of “warnings" prior to dismissal is thus given by  − 1. The
basic model is therefore one where  is restricted to the set {1∞}.
Let  () denote the value of being employed in agriculture for an agent
with  bad signals left. If  = 1 then the agent is dismissed the next time
 =  and  = . The agent is dismissed immediately upon  = 0 and so
 (0) = 0. Let () denote the bonus payment to the agent when  =  as
a function of the number of bad signals that remain .
The value function  () satisfies the following recursive equation:
 () = () +  (− 1) + (1− ) () (D1)
The agent’s incentive constraint, which as before is binding in the optimal
solution, can be simplified to:
() =  − ( ()−  (− 1)) (D2)
By combining (D1) and (D2) we obtain the following recursive formulation
for  ():
 () = + (− 1) (D3)
where the constants  and  are given by:
 = 
1−  + (+ ); =
(+ )
1−  + (+ )  (D4)
Observe that 0   and 0    1.
Given that  (0) = 0, the solution for  () in terms of the parameters of
the model is:
 () = (1−
)
1−  (D5)
It therefore follows that:
() = − −1 (D6)
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Observe that the bonus payments to the agent increase with . It can
be immediately verified that (1) and  (1) are identical to  and  of the
basic model, while  and  coincide to the limits of () and  () from
(D6) and (D5), respectively, as  tends to infinity.
We now solve for the optimal number . Denote the principal’s discount
factor by  , and denote the discounted expected discretionary costs for the
principal (that include bonus payments and dismissal costs) starting from the
point where it employs an agent has  bad signals left until dismissal under
a policy where agents are dismissed after  bad signals and are induced to
exert high eﬀort in every period by ( ).
For  = 1:
(1 ) = (1) + (+  ( )) + (1− ) (1 )
And for 1   ≤ :
( ) = () +  ( − 1 )(1− ) ( )
These two equations simplify to:
(1 ) = (1) +  + ( ) (D7)
and
( ) = () + ( − 1 ) (D8)
where the two constants  and  are given by:
 = 
1−  +  ;  =

1− 2 +   (D9)
Equations (D7) and (D8) can be explicitly solved for ( ) as a function
of the underlying parameters of the model as follows:
( ) = 
1−  +

 (1− ) +
( − )
(1− )( − )  (D10)
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It is reassuring to confirm that the solution of the equation (1 1) = (∞∞)
for  yields the threshold ˆ from the basic model, and is independent of the
principal’s discount factor  .
The following figure describes the optimal  (the  that minimizes (D10))
as a function of the level of transparency , for the same parameters used to
illustrate the basic model. The additional parameter  is set to  = 0982
n
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Figure 6: The optimal number of “bad signals” before dismissal, , as a
function of transparency 
This analysis confirms the robustness of our basic results. There may
be a range with suﬃciently low transparency where permanent tenancy is
provided. In this range, the total cost to the principal is highest and the
bonus payments are maximal. As transparency increases, the optimal 
decreases. In this range, as the information improves, the principal relies
more and more on the threat of dismissal to incentivize the agent (in the
sense of providing a smaller number of warnings) and at the same time also
provides lower bonuses. Thus, once again opacity of production provides the
tenant with both a form of de-facto property rights and greater reward for
exerting eﬀort.
2A lower discount rate for the principal reduces the discounted cost of dismissal and
shifts the curve of optimal ’s downwards.
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Finally, it should be noted that in our calibration the probability of a bad
signal (upon exerting eﬀort) is  = 02(1−) Hence, a bad signal or warning
is not issued more frequently than about every five years. In this case, the
expected time needed for five warnings is much larger than the expected life
span of an adult farmer, and so is eﬀectively equal to infinity.
Appendix E: Endogenous Population Size
In this appendix we allow the principal to control the size of individual
plots. This generalization yields new predictions with respect to the eﬀect of
transparency on the size of the population.
Suppose that output from a plot of size  is:
 () =
½  if  =  and  = ;
 otherwise.
The agent’s cost of high eﬀort is denoted by (). The cost function ()
is assumed to be increasing and convex and to be such that (0) = 0. A
larger plot size is associated with a larger cost of training a new agent. We
therefore assume that the replacement loss is given by () = .
If the size of the land is controlled by the principal is  , then the number
of plots (and agents) is given by . The principal is assumed to maximize
her expected payoﬀ from the entire land under her control. Thus, her problem
is:
Π = 0≥0∈{01}()[( − ) + −  − − (1− )]
s.t.
+  ≥ ()
 ≥ + ()
The analysis of the basic model where  = 1 applies to any   0. Both
the subsistence and incentive constraints are binding in the optimal solution,
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which implies that  =  + (). If the signal about the state of nature is
uninformative ( is suﬃciently low), a ‘pure carrot’ contract where:
 = 0  = () (E1)
is optimal. The principal’s problem in this range is equivalent to the selection
of  to minimize  (+ 2()). Given the convexity of (), the optimal
 is given by the unique solution to the first order condition:
0()− 0() = 
2
 (E2)
Similarly, if the signal about the state of nature is suﬃciently informative
( is suﬃciently high), then a ‘stick and carrot’ contract where:
 = 1 ( ) = () −
()
1− (+  − 2)  (E3)
is optimal. The principal’s problem in this range is equivalent to the selection
of  to minimize  (+ () + ( )] As before, the optimal solution
 is given by the unique solution to the first order condition:
0()− 0() = 
2− 
1−(+−2)
 (E4)
The convexity of () implies that the left-hand-side of (E2) and (E4)
is increasing in . The fact that the right-hand-side of (E2) is smaller than
that of (E4) and the right-hand-side of (E4) is increasing in  implies that
the optimal plot size under the ‘stick and carrot’ regime  increases with
transparency , and is larger than the optimal plot size under the ‘carrot’
regime .
The fact that    is due to the fact that when the stick is in use, it
costs less to incentivize the agent, and so the principal may as well assign a
larger plot size to the agent, which would allow it to economize on the fixed
cost of agents’ maintenance. The larger plot size implies, of course, a smaller
population.
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The extra decision variable  leads to a higher expected revenue to the
principal, in comparison with the case of a fixed plot size. To better evaluate
the impact of endogenous plot size, consider the case where the cost function
() has a constant elasticity 0()() = , calibrated so that (1) = 
so that the optimal plot size under the ‘pure carrot’ regime is still equal to
one ( = 1). This guarantees that under the ‘pure carrot’ contract every
aspect of the economy is identical to that of an economy with a fixed plot
size. However, the higher revenue under the ‘stick and carrot’ regime implies
that the new threshold transparency ˆ for switching into the ‘stick and
carrot’ contract is lower than before. At the transparency threshold ˆ the
agents are made discretely worse oﬀ when they are switched from a ‘pure
carrot’ contract to a ‘stick and carrot’ contract. But beyond this point, since
each agent’s net per-period utility depends positively on the expected bonus
payment  for high eﬀort, the larger plot size implies that agents are made
better oﬀ as transparency increases. Moreover, beyond the old threshold level
ˆ agents are better oﬀ than under the fixed plot case. This is compatible with
increased revenue to the principal, since the number of agents is smaller.
These results are similar to those depicted in Figure 1. If we set  = 1 so
that the principal’s expected income is identical to her income under a fixed
plot size, then the threshold ˆ is smaller and the principal’s income above
the threshold is higher. It should be noted that in a figure that captures
the principal’s income when plot size is endogenous the vertical diﬀerence
between the two lines does not represent each agent’s expected income, since
this (as noted above) is in fact increasing, due to the larger plot size.
To conclude, this appendix shows that if plot size is endogenous then as
economic activity becomes more transparent, the lower is population density.
Appendix F: The Urban Sector
In the model, we implicitly assume that all those individuals who do
not belong to the elite and are not employed in agriculture belong to the
urban sector. To simplify, we assume further that the urban sector does not
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trade with the farming sector. That is, the provision of protection and the
collection of tribute (‘protection’ revenue) is the only interaction between the
two sectors. We also simplify by consideration of a model with a single tier of
government, where the governor is identical to the king. The food collected
by the governor is evidently not consumed entirely by her. This food revenue
provides the means for supporting an army that provides protection to the
farming sector and secures the governor’s monopoly on the extraction of
revenue from farming activity. This food supply also sustains the artisans
who supply various amenities (including luxury items) for the governor and
his dependents, and may also possibly be exchanged for prestige goods from
abroad. Since some of the food that reaches the urban sector is in some
sense wasted on sumptuary meals or on imports, the ratio of the average
food collection to the food required for long-term maintenance of farmers
() provides an estimate of an upper bound on the size of the urban sector
that is supported by the farming sector.3
More significant than the relative sizes of the two sectors is the very dif-
ferent uncertainty in food supply that they face. The essence of this issue
can be clarified by considering what happens in bad years. At the level of
the individual farmer bad years occur with probability 1− 12. At the gov-
ernor’s level, however, they occur less frequently, with a lower probability of
1 − 2. This reflects the fact that the governor’s revenue bundles together
the revenue from many independent plots, and thus provides an insurance
against idiosyncratic plot bad states. However, our model also identifies a
diﬀerence in the severity of bad harvests due to village bad states. In this
case, our assumptions imply that the output of each farmer is 1, and the
revenue collected by the governor is 2 = 1 [1 − (1 + )]. In the numer-
ical calibration presented in the main text we set 1 = 1 + . This implies
that the income retained after a bad harvest enables farmers to survive until
3If farmers are employed in the construction of monuments over the Summer, and are
paid for their extra eﬀort by the state, as was customary in Egypt, this too would have to
be taken into account.
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the next harvest, but the governor and the urban sector obtain no revenue
at all. This extreme result is clearly due to our simple model and to this
particular calibration; but it reflects a general phenomenon: a larger share
of the farming output remains in the periphery after bad harvests. This cap-
tures another important and ill-understood aspect of ancient economies in
which the urban sector was likely to be more vulnerable to downward shocks
to output. This implies that hunger and starvation are likely to be con-
centrated particularly among the lower strata of the urban sector: servants,
small artisans and the like. This implication is in line with our presumption
that this segment of society is demographically vulnerable, and may not have
reproduced on its own, other than through an inflow from the farming sector.
In addition, under the circumstances assumed here, the vulnerability of the
urban sector implies that whereas farmers need only store food within the
year, inter-annual storage is an absolute necessity for the urban sector, as a
buﬀer for years where the harvest is small. This inter annual storage, how-
ever, should not be considered as providing insurance for the farming sector,
but rather as serving the urban sector.4
4This conclusion is consistent with the predominant archaeological finding of storage
pits and granaries in ancient urban centers, but is inconsistent with the common pre-
sumption (see for example Adams (1981, p. 244; 2005)), that urban central storage served
the entire population and was possibly the main service that the state provided to the
countryside.
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